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entire primer or as a separate annex
might have stitched the elements of
the book tighter together and made it
resonate more. Regardless, leaders at
all levels who want to increase their
chances of successfully implementing
and sustaining an organizational change
effort will benefit from making this an
essential addition to their tool kit.
KENNETH M. SANDLER

The Marine Corps Way of War: The Evolution of
the U.S. Marine Corps from Attrition to Maneuver
Warfare in the Post-Vietnam Era, by Anthony J.
Piscitelli. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2017.
264 pages. $27.50.

Despite battlefield success in both Iraq
and Afghanistan over the past fifteen
years, the threat environment confronting the United States and its Marine
Corps only has grown more dangerous.
The United States now confronts a
variety of challenges both old and new,
including the return of great-power
conflicts in the Asia-Pacific and Europe;
operating in (what until recently has
been called) an antiaccess/area-denial
(A2/AD) battle space; nuclear proliferation; and navigating the effects of global
climate change on military operations.
Such an environment calls for both refining old solutions and thinking in new,
bold ways to ensure that the U.S. military—and especially, for purposes of this
review, the Marine Corps—is ready to
meet, fight, and defeat any future threats.
Author Anthony Piscitelli leverages his
years of State Department and academic
experience to map the evolution of the
Marine Corps’s approach to war in
the post–Vietnam War era, all the
while highlighting the personalities
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involved in that process. Piscitelli’s
work ultimately is most useful, though,
not for reviewing why the Marine
Corps adopted maneuver warfare but
for providing a model for instituting
structural changes at the service level
necessary for future battlefield success.
Following the Vietnam War, a combination of external and internal pressures led
the Marine Corps to institutionalize and
train to a war-fighting philosophy it had
practiced to varying degrees throughout
its history. The Marine Corps Way of
War details how the Marine Corps had
practiced elements of maneuver warfare
from Belleau Wood to Beirut. This
historical survey provides the context
for the interpersonal and bureaucratic
battles that Piscitelli then recounts that
led to the Corps’s full embrace of maneuver warfare in the post-Vietnam era.
Piscitelli then uses an excellent combination of first-person interviews and
after-action reports to summarize how
the Corps’s success in all the humanitarian operations, low-intensity conflicts,
and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after
Vietnam resulted from the major internal
and external bureaucratic struggles over
the service’s future during that era. The
book’s emphasis on education and the
impact of maneuver warfare on Marines’
professional development also deserves
mention. Piscitelli’s decision to explore
how the adoption of maneuver warfare
also forced the Corps to rethink the
professional development of its enlisted
and officer populations underscores
how the human element of war remains
the most important variable in any
conflict. One should be forgiven for
thinking that parts of the book serve as
justification for MCDP-1, Warfighting.
Yet, despite providing an excellent
analysis that explores how the Corps
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evolved into its current form, the book
disappoints readers who want to learn
more about the implications of maneuver
warfare on future battlefields. Although
one might argue that such a discussion
falls outside the scope of this work, it
seems like a missed opportunity not to
devote some pages to answering that
question. How will the Marine Corps use
maneuver warfare to fight in an A2/AD
environment? What capabilities does the
Corps need to exploit Russia’s or China’s
critical vulnerabilities? How does the
service operate effectively and jointly
in a twenty-first-century great-power
conflict? Similarly, one also wonders how
changes to the Marine Corps’s maneuverwarfare theory that may be necessary
to succeed on future battlefields will
alter the professional development and
training of the service’s next generation
of recruits. Institutions such as the Basic
School or Marine Combat Training
might need a face-lift. Military occupation schools also will need to rethink
how they equip their students with the
skills necessary to support the Corps’s
war-fighting philosophy in future fights.
One question Piscitelli does answer
about the future of maneuver warfare is
how the service can promote the institutional change necessary to confront
future challenges. His discussion of the
informal civilian advocacy networks and
formal top-down leadership that Marine
leaders used to transform the Corps after
Vietnam provides a possible blueprint to
effect future force shaping. This might
be the book’s greatest contribution to
current national security narratives,
because it highlights how America’s
most unique service can facilitate
effectively the necessary structural,
service-level changes to the force.
ADAM TAYLOR
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The last few years have seen a surge in
titles covering different aspects of the
Royal Navy’s submarine service during
the Cold War. Together, these have
provided the armchair naval enthusiast
with welcome insights into a famously
understated and secretive part of that
service’s recent history. Whereas the
majority of these titles have been written
either by those who have commanded
ships and submarines or by historians
with long naval connections, this book
is distinctly different, coming as it does
from neither of these backgrounds.
Instead, this is an intensely personal
account of one man’s naval journey:
from curious schoolboy learning the
naval “religion,” through some early
personal disappointments, and finally
to his emergence as a successful and
highly respected member of the elite
brotherhood of nuclear-qualified
engineers. The book is different because
the mystique of command at sea is not
the centerpiece, having been replaced by
the equally demanding but far less well
understood world of nuclear safety, with
its attendant “zero defect” mentality.
Thompson is perhaps perfectly suited
to weave this tale. A career naval officer
and early volunteer for submarines
who was forced to make an early
“course change” into the engineering
specialization on account of his eyesight,
his destiny became inextricably bound
up with the buildup of the nuclear
submarine force in the United Kingdom.
In his case, this was reinforced further
by the adoption of the Polaris missile system and the ballistic-missile
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